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I would like to thank John Love for asking me to speak, and thank all of you for
your time and your attention.  I have been asked to speak on futures sugar policy
needs from the perspective of a member of the sugar trade.  I should be clear that,
while I spend my days working as an intermediary between sugar producers,
processors, traders and industrial users and thus have what is hopefully a useful
perspective, I am not, in fact, a “trader”.  As a sugar brokerage, my company does
not take title to sugar and does not take positions in the market.  We are not risk
takers.  Given this, I will nonetheless attempt to describe what a trader might like
to see from future sugar legislation.
Participants in the sugar trade do not tend to have a natural stance in the market
place. While a producer of sugar is a natural “long” and a manufacturer of refined
sugar from raw sugar or a manufacturer of finished goods is a natural “short” in
the market, a trader works between these various groups.  It is natural component
of a trader’s profile that he be a risk taker.
By this I mean that a trader’s role is, in part, to mitigate the market risk of
producers, manufacturers and end users of sugar.  The trader’s role is that of
merchant and market maker.  The trader is often a taker of price cover in up
markets and a giver of price cover in down markets as customers seek price cover.
Price risk, country risk, counter-party risk (in both up and down markets, by the
way), foreign currency and interest rate exposure, quality risk, and freight rate
risk are a trader’s lot in life by choice.  I would argue, however, that the current
sugar policy in the United States has dialed-up traders’ risk in an unmanageable
way and to an intolerable level, and that current sugar policy, if left unchanged,
will continue to heighten traders’ risk profile in the coming years.
You may ask yourself, why, should a trader’s comfort level be of concern to other
market participants?  The trade is sometimes viewed as opportunistic or even
mercenary in their dealings.  I would argue that the operator plays a seminal role
in the workings of the US market.  Over 23 % of our supply of raw sugar for
domestic consumption comes from the 40 quota-holding countries.  The trade
provides the means to finance and freight these sugars from origin to the US.
Through long term pricing contracts with their customers in the US, the trade
facilitates not only the supply of sugar, but also an efficient means of managing
the market risk related to those transactions in increasingly illiquid markets.
Anyone who has pondered taking a foreign producer to arbitration in a foreign
jurisdiction over a defaulted contractual obligation understands at least one small
component of the service provided to the broader market by the trade.Each day all of us make risk/reward calculations.  I would argue that the sugar
trade’s risk/reward ratio would argue against participating in the US market at all,
and that current sugar policy has played a major role in skewing that ratio.  One
need only look at the volumes traded on the New York Board of Trade Sugar # 14
contract, or count the number of traders currently involved in the US sugar market
on a day to day basis for evidence of the trades reluctance to participate.
What follows is a brief, and surely incomplete, listing of issues confronting the
sugar trade, which discourage trade participation in the market.    
Market access:
Quota - The current list of quota holders is badly outdated, based as it is on the
period from 1975 to 1981.  Many quota-holding nations are net-importers.
Through the WTO, the US has guaranteed access to 40 countries based on their
historical percentage.  Many of these countries are not consistent shippers, while
others are extremely efficient and could provide supply to the market in a far
more reliable and efficient manner.  One way to address this in efficiency would
be the adoption of a first-come, first-served quota scheme, which would
significantly enhance the trades’ ability to deliver raw sugar to the market in a
more efficient manner.  The USDA could still manage this flow through the use
of quarterly shipping patterns.
Mexico – Currently Mexico has a quota of 116,000 tonnes, yet the US Trade
Representative’s office has not given out the Certificates of Quota Eligibility that
are needed to actually bring these sugars into the US market.  With each week and
month that passes, the logistical impediments of moving 116,000 tonnes of
Mexican sugar to the US grow more daunting.  As long as a broader
comprehensive sweetener agreement between the US and Mexico is pending, the
prospect of significantly increased Mexican access overhangs the market.  How
can anyone seeking to manage risk do so when we this important piece of the
supply puzzle remains missing?  It would be in the trade’s interest to have this
matter resolved, one way or the other.
Administrative issues:
The USDA publishes its  World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimate
(WASDE) for sugar monthly, and this report represents, arguably, the most useful
gauge of the market’s prospects for a trader.  In fact, the basis for the USDA’s
management of the Tariff Rate Quota is the ending stocks/use ratio as reported in
the monthly WASDE.  Due to the fact that the CCC is holding massive stocks, the
ultimate disposition of which remains a mystery, ending stocks are not known
within 793,000 tons.  Based on the February report, actual accessible ending
stocks are somewhere between 1.234 million tons and 2.027 million tons.  The
ending stocks to use ratio is somewhere between 19.4 % and 11.8 %.  Taking
steps immediately to clarify the disposition of these stocks would clarify the
supply and demand picture, allowing for better decision making.
In the last year the market has been buffeted by a series of  market-distorting
events.  For companies seeking to manage risk, these events add a further element
of uncertainty.  The following chronology of events serves to underscore this.  I
should point out that none of the following are necessarily good or bad; necessaryor unnecessary; appropriate or inappropriate.  They are simply actions taken by
the USDA as part of its routine management of the sugar program, or actions
taken in reaction to some shortcoming in the program or its management.  Each of
these had some impact on prices and thus on traders’ risk profile.
September: Nothing happened.  The TRQ announcement, normally made by
September 15, is not made by September 30, 1999, leaving the market with no
access to foreign supply as the new quota year begins.  Various government
agencies struggled over the recourse/non-recourse loan issue, precluding a timely
announcement.
October: A waiver is granted, allowing California and Hawaiian Sugars to import
100,000 tons of sugar immediately and to export a like amount of sugar over a
five-year period.  The waiver is needed to prevent C&H form running out of
sugar.
November 2:  Quota is finally announced.  Even now, 227,000 tonnes are left
unallocated.  While in the past, a clear program was detailed by which the quota
would be allocated; the announcement stated simply that the USDA would make
the sugars “available to the USTR, if needed, as the administration reviews
market conditions and the operation of the sugar program”.
December: It is announced that the time period for the export of sugars under the
C&H waiver amended from five years to 180 days.
February: C&H waiver amended from 180 to 210 days.  The announcement also
states that the USDA will accept CQE’s for retirement in lieu of exports by C&H.
May 11:  USDA announces that it will purchase 150,000 tons of sugar and that
additional purchases will be considered depending on market prices and
conditions.
June 3: CCC actually purchases 132,000 tons of sugar from the industry.
July 25: Secretary Glickman addresses reporters, stating that he is considering
authorizing another round of sugar purchases.
July 31: 44,940 tons refined sugar (raw value) forfeited.
August 21: FSA announces details of a Payment in Kind (PIK) program for
sugar, the first of its kind for sugar.
August 31: 60,188 tons of refined sugar (raw value) and 50,281 tons of raw sugar
raw value are forfeited.
September 19: USDA announces preliminary results of PIK program.  More than
5,000 farmers offer to divert about 100,000 acres against 277,349 tons of refined
sugar from CCC stocks.  The title to these sugars will be transferred to assignees
between October 1 and December 31, according to the announcement.
September 31, 2000: 534,277 tons of whites (raw value) and 269,307 tons of
raws are forfeited to the CCC.  CCC inventory jumps to 1.1 million tons raw
value.
Lets look at this in sum.  In rough numbers, the entire quota was delayed, 227,000
tonnes were left unallocated, the west coast waiver impacted 100,000 tonnes,
132,000 tons were purchased and 968,000 tons were forfeited.  Thus, the flow of
roughly 2.5 million tonnes of sugar – nearly 25 % of all sugar either domestically
produced or imported last year - was affected (interrupted, impeded or precluded
altogether) due to the program’s faults or inadequacies.  For traders attempting tojudge a market with an eye on risk management, such constant intervention makes
the process hopelessly complex.
What, from a trader’s perspective, would be desirable in the context of futures
policy  needs?  A look back at the intent of the current program will prove
enlightening.
The program is currently set up to accommodate a minimal quota as per the
WTO, and supplemental tranches, which can be allocated based on needs.  If at
prescribed moments in time the ending stocks/use ratio for the given fiscal year is
at or less than 15.5 % after the additional sugars had been considered, the USDA
would direct the US Trade Representative to allocate the tranche.  While this
approach, which clearly borders on micro-management of the TRQ, may be
cumbersome there is at least a level of predictability to it. Traders would prefer no
intervention at all, but scheduled or predictable intervention is the next best
option.
This administrative approach, while theoretically still in place, is in reality no
longer viable.  The growth seen in the domestic crop, the partial opening of the
US market to foreign supply through the NAFTA and the sharp increase in over-
quota imports in the form of sugar containing products and syrups have taken
control of the market away from the USDA.  The regimented approach to
managing the quota has been replaced by a series of either pre-emptive or
reactionary moves.
At the excellent sessions earlier today, we heard the views of a beet grower, a
processor and a marketing firm.  While each of these industry segments has a
vested interest in the shape of US domestic sugar policy, those in the trade ask
only for a policy that is not inherently dysfunctional.  All that the trade can ask is
that sugar policy evolve and adapt to the current realities.  By 2008, we will have
an open border with Mexico, and it is likely that Mexican imports will profoundly
impact our market years before then.  If the US sugar policy and resultant
program is so dated that it can only be run through crisis management, a trader
would ask that the USDA take whatever actions are necessary to bring the market
back under control.
The best of all worlds for the sugar trade would be a market completely free from
intervention. While this is not realistic given that only a small percentage of world
sugar trade is not either subsidized of protected in some way, a market that is well
enough structured that it can be managed in a rational, thoughtful manner should
not be too much to ask for.